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ARGUMENT
I.

IHC's Arguments Cannot Avoid a Trial on the Intensely Fact-Dependent
Question Whether, Under AH the Circumstances, IHC Waived Forfeiture.
As to waiver, D&K made two compelling arguments: (1) that waiver is an

intensely fact dependent question that can be determined as a matter of law only if there
is but one inference that can be drawn from the totality of the circumstances, and (2) that
the trial court failed to view the facts regarding waiver in the light most favorable to
D&K and improperly drew inferences that were the province of the jury. IHC fails to
rebut either of these arguments in any meaningful way.
A.

IHC Misstates this Court's Treatment of the Facts in D&KL

With respect to D&K's Statement of Facts, IHC attempts to dismiss all facts that
support D&K's waiver defense with the assertion that they are "the same facts that this
Court already found to be irrelevant in D&K /," citing footnote 2 of that opinion. IHC
Brief at 4. Later, IHC argues that this Court noted that "any factual disputes were
'irrelevant' or immaterial.'" Id. at 16. In reality, footnote 2 characterized one fact as
irrelevant—whether D&K's rent payment for February 1998 (prior to the March rent
default) was timely—and one fact as immaterial—whether April 1998 rent (which IHC
accepted) was delivered to its property manager or to its corporate office.1 D&K makes
no issue in this appeal regarding those facts. IHC also overstates this Court's ruling in
D&K I, claiming that "this Court held that the material facts in this case regarding waiver
are undisputed." Id Instead, the Court noted that "the material facts in this case appear to

Thus, rather than relegating to irrelevance the facts on which D&K now relies to
show waiver, D&K I implicitly acknowledges their significance.
1

be undisputed/' D&K I, 2003 U T 5, 1J9, while holding that the trial court misapprehended
"one material fact.*

lowever,

whether a waiver occurred, a mixed question of law and feet to be decided under the
totality of the circumstances test. Prior to D&K I, that issue could be decided in the
affirmative as a matter o
Theat

u r . 2 d 700 (Utah 1977), because IHC accepted the April 1998 rent and

other consideration under the Lease after D & K had defaulted on the payment of rent for
March. After D&K I, that issi ic requires a trial.
HC Confuses the Standard of Review Regarding Waiver.
The standard of review of a summary judgment requires the appellate cour
*S ii*n III fm h in ' 7 11 ir'
to [the non-moving party] .

>f'- - >

•

" State Fa*

f

**
iuto. Ins.

*P the u r h t most favorable
<> v <freen, 2003 UT 48,

f 3 , 89 P.3d 97 (emphasis added). IHC takes the position that, when \yuiu:,i" is the issue,
11

'Afferent, advocating that

"trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether a waiver has occurred." IHC
Brief at 8. While this Court accorded "some measure oi deierence" to a trial court's legal
c

judgment

?

M

u reiterated the

universal rule that "[s]ummary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact," id, and described its three-step analytical approach as follows:
In a waiver case decided on a motion for summary judgment, we must first
inquire whether there are disputed material facts. If there are no disputed
material facts, w e consider all undisputed material facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, Peterson, 2002 U T 42 at f 7 , 48 P Id
9 4 1 , before determining whether the trial court's decision on the

2

application of the law of waiver to those facts falls within the bounds of its
discretion.
Id. Discretion is accorded the trial court only at the third step—application of the law. On
the waiver issue, this appeal focuses on the first two steps—whether there is a disputed
material fact (in the ultimate sense of whether a waiver occurred) and whether the trial
court considered all undisputed material facts from which waiver could be inferred in the
light most favorable to D&K. Those issues are addressed below.
IHC's reliance on Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7 (Utah App. 1995),
for the proposition that a summary judgment as to waiver is reviewed for abuse of
discretion is unavailing. Kudlik did not involve a summary judgment motion at all, but
rather a ruling, based on a trial in an unlawful detainer case, that no waiver had occurred.
C.

IHC Misconstrues the Escrow Agreement and Overstates its Effect.

Relying in whole or in part on the Consent, Reservation of Rights and Escrow
Deposit Agreement dated March 1, 1999 (the "Escrow Agreement"), R157-162, IHC
makes the following points:
1.

"The Escrow Agreement was designed to preserve the status quo of the
landlord/tenant relationship, without either party being accused of having
waived their arguments in this litigation." IHC Brief at 7.

2.

"IHC's post-Termination Notice conduct cannot now be claimed a waiver
of its rights to terminate D&K's leasehold." Id. at 8.

3.

"Moreover, the trial court properly concluded that IHC's actions were . . .
undertaken pursuant to the Escrow Agreement by which D&K agreed that
IHC's conduct would not constitute a waiver." Id. at 10.

3

'The parties do not dispute that IHC never accepted2 or cashed any rent
check after April 1998, except under the Escrow Agreement, pursuant to
which D&K agreed that IHC did 'not waive its claims of default and/or
forfeiture of the Lease.'" Id. at 18.
"D&K argues that IHC's
receipt of rent checks under the Escrow
Agreement . . . create[s] a triable dispute as to whether an implied waiver
occurred." M at 19
6.

F.uii (

"D&K's argument that IHC engaged in "dozens of acts
Ittat recognized
the Lease as in force' (Appellant's Br. at 20), is directly contrary to D&K's
contractual agreement
" Id. at 21 "*°
I

In iiiHH!r.li,iiI»l\ liilM l'i iiiiiil

ick -my factual basis and are not

true. The other points claim too much for the Escrow Agreement M was dated March 1,
1999, long after IHC had declared U6,.
affirniiilisv

I ii

I

. ,„

- eptance

>rleited.
1998 rent, "Dear Tenant" letters

seeking to hold D&K to the strict terms of the Lease and many invoices for rent), and
there were numerous instances < • • : . . .

n as retentu:.,

checks 1: ;; II IC foi i i i anths ait id

amerous

* ' )&K summarized and discussed those

facts, Brief of Appellant at 5-6, 17- 18, and IHC has not disputed them.. The Escrow
Agreement expressly reserved D&K's right to argue waiver on those a.,
tl

n provided

• defenses by si^nin^, liu/ Escrow Agreement

or by D&K being allowed to remain in possession of the leased premises oi to make

2

The reality is that D&K has maintained the position throughout this case that, by
retaining most of D&K's rent checks tendered from May 1998 through February 1999
(prior to the Escrow ^ greement), IHC accepted D&K's tendered rent. R42, f 18.
3

"[A]ll of D&K Management's defenses against the claims and assertion
IHCHS, whether articulated before or after the date of this Escrow Agreement ;J\
expressly reserved and not waived by reason of this Escrow Agreement or otherwise and
shall not in any way be lessened or diminished by reason of or in connection with the
execution and delivery of this Escrow Agreement." R15 8
4

deposits thereafter with the escrow agent. Thus, it is IHC's argument that is "directly
contrary" to its contractual agreement.
D.

D&K'S Counsel Never Conceded that There Was Not a Triable Issue as to
the Waiver Defense.

Another fallacy on which IHC places enormous reliance is its contention that
D&K's counsel conceded at a hearing on May 26, 2004, that "there were no disputed
facts on the issue of possession." IHC Brief at 17. The hearing in question took place
after the trial court had granted IHC's Motion to Modify Order or for Summary Judgment
rejecting the defense of waiver following remand from this Court in D&KL The purpose
of the hearing was to address IHC's request for a certification of finality under Rule
54(b). In the exchange between the trial court and D&K's counsel, the court inquired as
to the presence of "overlapping facts" for purposes of applying the Kennecott4 analysis to
Rule 54(b). Counsel's response was that, "given the Court's ruling [summary judgment
against D&K], there are no facts left-no facts that have to be decided." Transcript, Rl 108
at 4-5. Counsel then repeated his qualification, "given this ruling," meaning that his
response was premised on the Court having already ruled against D&K on waiver.
In opposing IHC's Motion to Modify Order or for Summary Judgment following
remand, D&K argued that it was entitled to an inference of waiver based on the true facts
concerning the April 1998 payment (which the trial court had misapprehended). R799
("[correction of this factual error adds one more fact from which an inference of waiver
can be drawn"). D&K argued that waiver was "a genuine issue of fact to be resolved by
the jury." R803. It argued that "[i]t is only when the facts permit of a single conclusion
4

Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991).
5

that waiver may be decided as a matter of law." R804. D&K argued that waiver "cannot
be resolved on a motion for summary judgment if the evidence can give rise to differing
inferences." Id. It further cited controlling authority holding that on a motion for
summary judgment the court may not draw fact inferences regarding intent. Id.
Having carefully presented these arguments in its memorandum, it is inconceivable that D&K's counsel would, in an off-the-cuff response to a question of the court on a
different point, volunteer that everything he had argued in writing was wrong. Counsel's
statement must be considered in context of the entire transcript. Counsel stated that
"D&K firmly believes that IHC waived its remedy," Transcript, Rl 108 at 9 (Addendum
A), reminded the court that waiver is "an intensely factual issue," id, clearly expressed
his view that "D&K is entitled to a trial on that issue," id. at 9-10, and reiterated "that
we're entitled to a trial on that issue because it is a factual issue." Id. at 10.
Thus, counsel was not abandoning D&K's central argument that it was entitled to
a trial to determine what inferences should be drawn from the undisputed historical facts.
While counsel may have been speaking to the first step of the three-part analysis
discussed in D&K I {i.e., historical, but not inferential, facts were undisputed), he was not
addressing the second, that of viewing the facts in the light most favorable to D&K,
which includes considering all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts.
E.

When Viewed in the Light Most Favorable to D&K, the Facts Support an
Inference of Waiver by IHC.

IHC purports to analyze the facts in the light most favorable to D&K and, not
surprisingly, concludes that they could not possibly support an inference that IHC waived
the right to forfeit the Lease. IHC's analysis suffers from several glaring flaws.
6

First, it begins with the premise that D&K I limited the trial court, in performing
the three-step analysis described above, to the narrowest of roles-that of considering
IHC's retention of the April 1998 rent payment on the assumption that the trial court's
previous ruling was otherwise correct in all respects. That premise collides with this
Court's opinion of that ruling as being "premature, at best":
Under the totality of the circumstances test required by Soter 's, the fact that
IHC retained D&K's payment for April rent is material. D&K presented the
trial court with a list of actions by IHC that D&K believed amounted to
waiver. The trial court considered each of them, but it could not have
considered the cumulative impact of those facts coupled with the retention
of April rent because it apparently believed that the rent was not retained by
IHC, Because of the absence of this fact in the trial court's analysis, the
grant of summary judgment was premature, at best.
D&K I, 2003 UT 5, ^[9. On remand for "further proceedings consistent with this opinion,"
id f 12, the trial court was to apply the three-step analysis prescribed by the Court.5 On
the second step, it was required to "consider all undisputed material facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id ^6 (emphasis added). It was not authorized
to analyze the facts concerning the April payment to the exclusion of all others.
Second, IHC quarrels with this Court's opinion that "the fact that IHC retained
D&K's payment for April rent is material." Id. ^[9. After discussing its own views on the
significance of the April rent, IHC concludes, "the April rent is irrelevant to either the
question of default by D&K or waiver by IHC." IHC Brief at 20. In fact, IHC is bound by
this Court's opinion that IHC's retention of the April rent is material.

The third step is slightly different at the trial court, which must itself apply the
law of waiver to the facts after they have been viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.
7

Third, knowing that its narrow perception of the trial court's role on remand may
be incorrect, IHC contends that all of the other facts relied on by D&K to support waiver
"do not give rise to an inference that IHC intended to affirm the Lease for two main
reasons." Id. at 21. The first is that the trial court's "stay" forced IHC to "act as D&K's
'landlord'" and to "undertake certain actions to protect itself, such as requiring that the
building be insured." Id. IHC throws time out of joint. Every fact D&K relies upon to
show waiver occurred between March 1998 (when a breach occurred) and March 1, 1999
(signing of Escrow Agreement). During that entire period, not only was there no stay, but
there was no case pending in which a stay could have been issued.
The second "main reason" proffered by IHC as vitiating all of the actions and
inactions of IHC as bases for inferring waiver is the Escrow Agreement. As discussed
above, the Escrow Agreement did not extinguish, but expressly preserved, all previously
existing defenses, including all grounds for waiver.
Apart from these "two main reasons," IHC offers no other reason why D&K
should not be entitled, on summary judgment, to an inference of waiver based on all of
the facts apart from IHC's retention of the April 1998 rent. When reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, this Court liberally construes all inferences that may be reasonably
drawn from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc.,
818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991). Moreover, "[wjhere a waiver prevents a forfeiture, the
law ordinarily permits a liberal construction to be placed on the acts of the party waiving
with the view of bringing about a waiver of such a forfeiture." Sullivan v. Beneficial Life
Ins. Co., 64 P.2d 351, 361 (Utah 1937), quoting Loftis v. Mutual Ins. Co., 114 P. 134

8

(Utah 1911). The trial court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous, and this case
should be remanded for a jury trial on the issue of waiver.
II.

Substantial Compliance Should Be Considered on the Merits.
Both parties recognize the trial court's power to reconsider and revise its non-final

orders. D&K submits that this power is broad, giving the court a valuable and flexible
tool for reaching just results. IHC perceives this power as a timid, hide-bound concept
hedged about by numerous virtually impenetrable checkpoints designed to keep the court
as far from the merits as possible. These differing views reflect the inherent tension
between the goal of fairly deciding controversies based on the facts and the law and that
of judicial efficiency. Underlying this debate lurks the stark reality that the loss to D&K
from forfeiture would cost it $3.2 million based on a five-year damage horizon, while the
loss to IHC of 46 days' interest on $3,280 was only $41.34, which D&K offered to pay
eightfold, Brief of Appellant at 31-32, and IHC would, if the Lease survives, receive
exactly what it bargained for when it bought the property subject to the Lease.
As will be shown below, the trial court did not soundly exercise discretion on this
question, as it both ruled that it had none and based its decision on critical legal errors. In
its brief, IHC makes many dubious or wrong assumptions and arguments, as well as
inaccurate representations or characterizations concerning the record. D&K will address
those matters but will first offer a larger perspective.
A.

Based on Correct Legal Conclusions and Applying Proper Standards, It
Would Have Been an Abuse of Discretion to Refuse Consideration of the
Substantial Compliance Defense.

IHC argues that its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in the earliest
stage of this case (prior to any discovery, with no supporting affidavits and based solely
9

on the pleadings) put D&K under obligation to support all of its defenses factually and
with legal authority even though IHC's motion mentioned only two of them. Its argument
fails to comprehend the limitations of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
A motion by plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings can only stand upon
the basis that defendants' answer admits all plaintiffs material allegations
and offers nothing in bar or by way of avoidance. It is in order only when
the answer raises no issue or states no facts which in law could be a defense
to any part of plaintiff s claim as covered in the motion.
Harman v. Yeager, 110 P.2d 352, 353-354 (Utah 1941). Such motions are disfavored, and
great liberality in construing the assailed pleading should be allowed. MBNA America
Bank, N.A. v. Williams, 2006 UT App 432,1J2, 147 P.3d 536.
Three months after the remittitur following D&K /, IHC renewed its effort to
obtain a forfeiture ruling by seeking partial summary judgment. IHC cites several cases
for the proposition that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must support
any affirmative defenses or waive them. IHC Brief at 27-28. On this question the cases
are sharply divided. While Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F.Supp. 1164
(S.D.Ind. 1992), supports IHC's position, it has been soundly rejected in Cytec Industries,
Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 232 F.Supp.2d 821, 829 (S.D. Ohio 2002) ("The reasoning of
the Pantry court is not supported by any provision of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure nor any case law.").
In the context of summary judgment, it is well settled that the moving party
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion. This initial burden remains with the moving party,
even when the issue involved is one on which the non-movant will bear the
burden of proof at trial, such as the Defendant's affirmative defenses in the
present case.
Given the Plaintiffs failure to address the Defendant's affirmative
defenses in its initial summary judgment Memorandum, the Defendant had
10

no obligation in its opposing Memorandum to demonstrate a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to those defenses. . . . Regardless of the
Court's ruling on the Plaintiffs Motion, those affirmative defenses will
remain viable in this litigation, as the Plaintiff has not properly moved for
summary judgment on them.
Books-A-Million, Inc. v. H & N Enters., Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 846, 851 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly, in Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.,
2002 UT 69, f31, 54 P.3d 1054, this Court clarified the order of business to be that "once
the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that
no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact."
Other cases relied on by IHC should be distinguished. In Rocafort v. IBM Corp.,
334 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2003), the issue was whether a party's failure to explicitly raise an
issue before the district court foreclosed that party from raising the issue for the first time
on appeal. Rocafort pointed out as a significant ground for its decision that such party
"never called the district court's attention to its alleged error by way of a motion for
reconsideration." Id. at 122. In contrast, D&K did exactly that. In H & G Ortho, Inc. v.
Neodontics Intern., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. App. 2005), the ruling that an issue not
raised in the trial court could not be reviewed on appeal was based on the rule that "once
the moving party designates evidence relevant to an affirmative defense, the burden shifts
to the defendant to come forward with competent evidence to support the affirmative
defense." Id. at 731. In the present case, IHC's motion for summary judgment, after
D&K I, did not address the defense of unconscionability/substantial compliance. Since
IHC never challenged D&K's case with respect to unconscionability, D&K was not

11

obligated to present evidence supporting it. Thus, the defense should not be deemed
waived.
An oral forfeiture ruling issued on March 2, 2004, but the written order was not
settled until July 29, 2004. Meanwhile, on May 26, 2004, D&K advised the court that
substantial compliance remained to be decided, reiterated that the law abhors a forfeiture
and referred to Housing Auth. of Salt Lake City v. Delgado, 914 P.2d 1163 (Utah App.
1996), and Cache County v. Bern, 1999 UT App. 134; 978 P.2d 1043. Brief of Appellant
at 9-10; see p. 19, infra. The court expressed its incorrect opinion that those issues had
already been decided as part of its ruling on waiver. Id. Counsel's statements constituted
"inadequate briefing" or the oral equivalent thereof. D&K was entitled to ask the court in
a fully briefed motion to reconsider its erroneous legal conclusion that a decision on
waiver is a decision on substantial compliance.
Turning to the topic of judicial efficiency, no case management order was entered
(except as to IHC's later abandoned Supplemental Complaint), nor was there a time limit
set for amending pleadings or completing discovery. No trial date was ever set. D&K
specifically raised substantial compliance with the court a short time after it ruled in favor
of forfeiture but two months before the order ultimately memorializing the ruling was
entered. The facts supporting substantial compliance were in the record by June 10, 2004,
R912-927, and IHC had ample opportunity to investigate them in the battle over a stay
pending appeal. Since D&K was entitled to a trial on damages and waiver, the
incremental burden of trying substantial compliance would have been minor. Moreover,
even if it had been the only issue, a trial on substantial compliance would have consumed
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far less of the court's time than the parties' battles over Rule 54(b) certification, stays
pending appeal and IHC's attorney fees. In short, efficiency considerations were not
compelling.
Efficiency cannot hold a candle to the countervailing consideration of doing
justice between the parties. Here, forfeiture was declared without any cure period
whatsoever being afforded to D&K. Even the forfeiture notice was suspect, relying on a
claimed failure to pay April 1998 rent, when IHC had already received that rent. Upon
receiving the notice, D&K immediately tendered the March 1998 rent (along with a 10%
late fee), which IHC's designated agent accepted and receipted. IHC then returned it. The
loss of D&K's leasehold would have a devastating financial impact, with losses
amounting to millions of dollars. Forfeiture would be manifestly unjust. The trial court
made an error. Even if the error, however, were solely that of D&K's counsel, it would be
manifestly unjust to refuse to consider a defense so compelling as substantial compliance
against a claim so draconian as forfeiture. With such extreme harm juxtaposed against
pallid excuses for refusing to consider the defense, the trial court's ruling, had it chosen
to exercise its discretion based on a correct application of legal principles, would have
been an abuse of discretion.
B.

The Elements of the Trial Court's Decision Are Reviewed for Correctness.

With respect to the trial court's denial of D&K's motion for reconsideration, IHC
simplistically advocates that the standard of review is simply whether the trial court
abused its discretion, citing Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996). IHC Brief at
9. In Timm, however, the Court held that, if the trial court's decision was based on an
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erroneous legal conclusion, that alone constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1388.
Similarly, one of the cases cited by Timm for the abuse of discretion standard is Gillmor
v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993), in which the Court articulated the standard of
review for a motion to reconsider (in the context of Rule 60(b)) as follows:
"A motion or action to modify a final judgment is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which must be based on sound
legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances."
Id, quoting Laub v. South Central Utah Tel Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982).
An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is premised on an erroneous legal
conclusion or is not based on "sound legal principles in light of all relevant
circumstances."
C.

IHC's Arguments Concerning Materiality and Unconscionability Are
Premised on the Assumption that Such Matters Are Affirmative Defenses.

D&K argued in its opening brief that a landlord fails to state a claim for forfeiture
unless it pleads materiality of the breach. Appellant's Brief at 22. Disputing that
conclusion, IHC premises its arguments concerning materiality, substantial compliance
and unconscionability on the assumption that all aspects of such matters are affirmative
defenses. Many courts reject that assumption, placing the burden of proof on the landlord.
In order to evict a tenant in North Carolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That
it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the
alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof of the happening of an act
or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3)
that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4)
that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not unconscionable.
Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (N.C.App. 1996)
(emphasis added). Accord, Oxford Associates Real Estate, L.P. v. TSI Society Hill, Inc.,
2007 WL 128886, *3 (E.D.Pa. 2007) ("Since Landlord has failed to show that it is
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entitled to the extraordinary remedy of forfeiture and that the result would not be
unconscionable, judgment in favor of Tenant is appropriate.")- See Helsam Realty Co.,
Inc. v. HJ.A. Holding Corp., 781 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557 (N.Y. Supp. App. Term 2004) ("In
order for a forfeiture clause to be enforced . . . the result of enforcing the forfeiture must
not be unconscionable."), citing 2 Dolan, Rasch's Landlord and Tenant Summary
Proceedings § 23:39 [4th ed].
This issue is of such importance that it ought to be decided, both to guide the
parties and the trial court in this case and to clarify for future cases what elements must
be pleaded and proven to accomplish forfeiture of a lease. While IHC contends that the
issue has been waived, its argument fails to recognize the unique status of the defense of
failure to state a claim afforded by Rule 12(h), Ut. R. Civ. P., which provides as an
exception to the general rule of waiver applicable to matters not presented by motion,
answer or reply that:
the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . .
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits . . . .
Decisions applying the identical federal rule clarify its effect. E.g., Martin v.
Southwestern Virginia Gas Co., 135 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 1998) ("If the defendant pleaded
as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff failed to state a claim, the defense is preserved
even if the trial court did not rule upon it."); Westland v. Sero of New Haven, Inc., 601
F.Supp. 163 (D. 111.1985) (defendant did not waive motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action since that defense was raised in its answer to the complaint). Further, in
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Martin the court held that the issue of failure to state a claim was preserved for appeal
even though not addressed by the trial court.
D.

IHC's Hypertechnicai Argument that D&K Did Not Plead Substantial
Compliance Is Inconsistent with the Concept of Notice Pleading.

D&K asserted "unconscionability" as a separate defense in its Answer. R45,
Seventh Defense. Despite that, IHC relies upon hypertechnicai hairsplitting, arguing that
it was never "put on notice that D&K intended to rely on a substantial compliance
defense" and that "D&K offers no explanation as to how IHC or the trial court should
have surmised that its defense of 'unconscionability' encompassed a possible 'substantial
compliance' argument." IHC Brief at 24. The answer lies in the case law.
It is only when the forfeiture would be so grossly excessive as to be entirely
disproportionate to any possible loss that might have been contemplated, so
that to enforce it would shock the conscience, that a court of equity will
refuse to enforce the provision.
Jacobson v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1954). If a result would "shock the
conscience" or cause forfeiture

"disproportionate to any possible loss," it is

unconscionable.
It is also axiomatic that a Court of equity may relieve a lessee against
forfeiture when the effect of enforcing the tenant's default would result in
an eviction which would be unconscionable, inequitable or unjust under the
circumstances.
Smith v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 448 So.2d 62, 63 (Fla.App. 1984).
Over the years, Utah courts began to use the term "substantial compliance" to
refer, or give greater definition to, this concept of unconscionability of result. See U-Beva
Mines v. Toledo Min. Co., 471 P.2d 867, 869 (Utah 1970); Cache County v. Beus, 1999
UT App 134, ^28; 978 P.2d 1043. In a lease forfeiture action, a tenant opposing forfeiture
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could allege that the breach was not material6, serious or substantial, that the result sought
would "shock the conscience of the court/' that the tenant had "substantially complied"
with the lease, or that the result sought is barred by the doctrine of "unconscionability."
In notice pleading it ought not matter which of these terms is chosen by the tenant's
lawyer.
It is evident from these statements that the fundamental purpose of our
liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties "the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute,"
subject only to the requirement that their adversary have "fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type
of litigation involved." The functions of issue-formulation and factrevelation are appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process. The
rules "allow examination into the settlement of all issues bearing upon the
controversy," with latitude for proof that extends beyond the pleadings,
where appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears from the cited decisions that
these principles are applied with great liberality in sustaining the
sufficiency of allegations stating a cause of action or an affirmative
defense.
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
Even if it had the burden to plead this point, D&K is entitled to liberality in
sustaining the sufficiency of its allegation of "unconscionability" as preserving the
defense that there was no material default a la Beus and D&K had substantially complied
with the Lease in good faith.
E.

D&K I Did Not Purport to Rule on the Defense of Unconscionability.

In an attempted verbal sleight of hand, IHC argues that D&K I disposed of all
issues involving unconscionability in its ruling as to equitable estoppel, merely because

Under Beus, the materiality analysis includes the five factors listed in
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981), as quoted in Brief of Appellant at 33.
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the Court used the word "unconscionable" twice in its analysis of estoppel by
acquiescence. IHC Brief at 25. When this Court analyzed D&K's estoppel defense in
D&K /, it did not wander afield and attempt to determine, without briefing or argument,
whether forfeiture of the Lease was an unconscionable result under U-Beva and Bens
standards. Its analysis was strictly confined to the estoppel defense:
Estoppel by acquiescence is applicable when "it would be unconscionable
to permit a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he
. . . has acquiesced." Permitting IHC to enforce the forfeiture provision of
the written lease after D & K's failure to pay rent following a one-month
acquiescence in late payment is not unconscionable, and D & K's estoppel
argument therefore fails as a matter of law.
2003 UT 5, f 11 (citation omitted). This language did not purport to be and was clearly
not intended to be a ruling, as a matter of law, that forfeiture of a leasehold worth
millions was not an unconscionable result in light of U-Beva and Beus, which the Court
never mentioned. Surely, where forfeiture is sought, D&K is entitled to the same
solicitude and even-handed analysis afforded to Cache County in Bens,
F.

The "Concessions" of Counsel Claimed by IHC Are Belied by Context.

IHC trumpets as the centerpiece of its heroic effort to prevent a decision on the
merits of the doctrine of substantial compliance a claimed concession by D&K's counsel
in the course of a hearing on a different matter-that of Rule 54(b) certification. As
discussed at 5, supra, counsel's statement was subject to the qualification "given the
Court's ruling." At that point, the trial court was not conducting a rehearing on its prior
grant of summary judgment on possession. Rather, it wanted to know whether "there are
. . . facts yet to be resolved with respect to the issue of forfeiture and possession that are
in common with the facts to be resolved regarding the breach of contract damages claim."
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Transcript, R1108 at 37 (emphasis added). More importantly, the transcript as a whole
clearly reveals that, whatever counsel may have thought the court was asking, he did not
intend to waive D&K's ability to rely on the doctrine of substantial compliance.
When the court raised the issue of "where we go from here procedurally," id. at 34
(Addendum A), counsel referred to the Delgado and Bens cases and advised the court
that the issues thereunder "are yet to be decided in this case." Id. The court expressed its
opinion that those issues had necessarily been decided as part of its ruling on waiver,
saying:
I don't think the Court can determine forfeiture—wavier [sic]
equaling forfeiture without implicitly dealing with the Delgado-Buse [sic]
line and the non-substantial—whatever the term is.
Id. Twice in the same hearing counsel had stated the principle that "the law abhors a
forfeiture." Id. at 8, 16. He used the term "substantial compliance" thrice. Id. at 15-16,
34. He noted that there are cases striking down forfeiture where a party "may have
missed on a technicality." Id. at 15-16. When viewed as a whole in their context, the
statements of D&K's counsel demonstrate the opposite of what IHC claims for them.9
Another instance of IHC's reliance on statements of D&K's counsel taken out of
context is its argument that the trial court gave, and D&K declined, repeated
opportunities to raise defenses other than waiver. IHC Brief at 29. IHC's argument is

7

The herein-cited pages of the Transcript are attached in Addendum A.

o

The reporter inaccurately transcribed this phrase as "the law enforce the
forfeiture."
9

Moreover, since the trial court incorrectly conflated waiver and the substantial
compliance doctrine, a motion for reconsideration was precisely the right procedure.
19

wrong in every way. It cites but one short passage of the record, not many.

The trial

court's question, whether the law of summary judgment precluded a ruling as a matter of
law that no waiver had occurred, cannot be rationally construed as an invitation to present
other affirmative defenses. Attempting to cast the response as something different from
what was said, IHC resorts to extreme editing of the two-page long response by D&K's
counsel (interspersed with comments by the court) to reduce it to two words, "Absolutely
. . . waiver . . . . " IHC's argument is absolutely unfounded.
G.

The Trial Court Exercised No Discretion on Reconsideration.

Curiously, IHC argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to
consider substantial compliance even though it: (1) ruled, based on law of the case, that it
had no discretion, (2) failed to apply the standards applicable to a Rule 54(b) decision,
and (3) turned a blind eye to the compelling facts in the record supporting D&K's
substantial compliance argument. As discussed at 13-14, supra, an exercise of discretion
"must be based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances" and, if it
is based on an erroneous legal conclusion, constitutes an abuse of discretion for that
reason alone.
1.

Law of the Case Did Not Deprive the Trial Court of Discretion,

Stating it "does not believe it has had the right or discretion to consider"
substantial compliance on the merits, Rl372-73, the trial court cited only Smith v.
Osguthorpe, 2005 UT App 11 (unpublished opinion), and said it was persuaded by a
statement therein that "when there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to

10

The relevant pages of the March 2, 2004 Transcript are attached in Addendum

B.
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those issues which the party had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the
other proceeding." R1373. Implicitly conceding that Osguthorpe does not correctly state
the law, IHC attempts to recast the trial court's ruling as having been based on some
other uncited case(s) and some other unarticulated rule(s).
The January 2006 Order plainly evinces the trial court's opinion that the prior
appeal resulting in D&K I had a preclusive effect, both with respect to issues decided
therein and with respect to any issues that might have been raised prior to or in the course
of that appeal R1371, ^|6, R1373, ^|9. In its opening brief, D&K discussed the principle,
contrary to the trial court's view, that a ruling on a prior appeal is a basis for law of the
case only with respect to issues actually or necessarily decided in that appeal. In support
thereof D&K cited five decisions of this Court. Brief of Appellant at 25-26. IHC does not
dispute this rule and does not question any of the authorities cited by D&K in support
thereof. Instead, IHC incorrectly describes it as the "mandate rule"11 and employs the
straw man tactic of arguing that "D&K is wrong in arguing that the requirements of the
'mandate rule' applied to the trial court on its Motion to Reconsider." IHC Brief at 33. In
fact, D&K made no such argument. At bedrock, since the trial court's decision that it had
no discretion in the matter was based on an erroneous legal principle, the January 2006
Order cannot stand.

The mandate rule is that an inferior court is required to honor the mandate of a
superior court within a single judicial system. Here, there was no ruling or mandate in
D&K I with respect to substantial compliance issues, yet the trial court acted as if it had
received a mandate not to consider those issues.
21

D&K cited two decisions of this Court holding that law of the case does not
prevent a judge from reconsidering previous nonfinal orders pursuant to Rule 54(b). Brief
of Appellant at 28-29. IHC ignores both cases, advocating instead a rule opposite to their
holdings. IHC offers no rationale to persuade this Court to abandon its prior decisions,
and it should not do so.
2.

The Trial Court Failed to Apply Correct Legal Principles.

In failing to apply the standards governing Rule 54(b), the trial court failed to
apply sound legal principles. The reasoning in its January 2006 Order consisted primarily
of four elements. First, the court repeated six times with minor variations the view that
D&K did not raise, argue or brief the defense of substantial compliance. Second, it
incorrectly ruled (as discussed above) that it was precluded by law of the case and res
judicata from considering the issue. Third, it relied, adopting language proposed by IHC,
on the erroneous notions discussed above that D&K was arguing that unconscionability is
not the same defense as substantial compliance and that D&K told the court at a 54(b)
certification hearing that there were no facts left to be considered on forfeiture. Fourth, it
ruled that the facts presented did not support substantial compliance.
3.

D&K Presented Compelling Facts Showing Substantial Compliance,

One of the most astounding errors of the trial court was its conclusion that the
facts presented by D&K did not support substantial compliance. This error was
thoroughly exposed in D&K's opening brief. Brief of Appellant at 32-35. IHC's response
is yet another iteration of its refrain that D&K I had rejected unconscionability as a
separate defense. IHC Brief at 42. This time, however, IHC also cites, out of context,
passages from D&K's brief filed in the prior appeal. That brief is not part of the record,
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but should the Court choose to review it anyway, it will be abundantly clear that D&K's
prior argument addressed its estoppel defense exclusively.
IHC sedulously avoids any mention of the facts relied on by D&K and never
contradicts D&K's argument that it has a far more compelling case for substantial
compliance than did Cache County in Bens. IHC incorrectly claims Kudlik and Olympus
Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App.
1994), "allowed forfeiture of a lease based on the simple failure of the tenant to pay rent."
Id. at 42-43. Kudlik never mentioned forfeiture but was an unlawful detainer case, in
which the tenant was afforded multiple opportunities to cure, unlike D&K, which
received none. Olympus Hills allowed termination of a lease after notice of default, a
thirty-day cure period and absence of cure, for violation of a continuous operations
clause—not for a rent default. The trial court, relying apparently on the same argument
made by IHC below, R1281, erroneously determined that D&K's substantial compliance
defense would be futile. Since that defense was not futile, but supported by compelling
facts, the trial court's ruling was fatally based on an erroneous legal conclusion.
III.

IHC Fails to Show Any Contractual Basis for the Attorney Fees Award.
The trial court ruled that IHC expressly waived any claim to attorney's fees under

Section 17.2 of the Lease and cannot recover fees thereunder. R1385 n.l. IHC did not
appeal that ruling. It chose to rely solely on Section 23, which requires for an award of
fees that the action be filed "during the term of this Lease." D&K cited four decisions of
this Court that when a landlord elects to terminate a lease for breach, the termination is
effective, if at all, when the notice is given. Brief of Appellant at 37. That occurred over a
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year prior to the action. Nowhere has IHC questioned those decisions or cited any
authority for the trial court's novel conclusion that the Lease was not terminated until the
court ruled in favor of ejectment.
IV.

The Fee Award Was Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence, Included Fees for
Matters on Which IHC Did Not Succeed and Resulted from an Improper
Shifting of the Burden of Proof to D&K.
IHC mistakenly argues that a 300-page record created over a period of eleven

months in obtaining a fee award, based on sheer volume, constitutes sufficient evidence
to support the fees awarded. A mass of information without the mandatory allocation
among successful and unsuccessful matters remains insufficient to sustain IHC's
evidentiary burden. As D&K demonstrated with extensive detail, the information
submitted by IHC reveals numerous time entries irrelevant to the case and therefore
unreasonable or that obviously applied to matters on which IHC did not prevail.
The only defense offered for the trial court's improper shifting of the burden of
allocating fees to D&K is IHC's argument that, despite a one-month extension, D&K did
not do IHC's job of sifting thousands of time entries in a 90-page affidavit and allocating
them among the seven discrete matters named by D&K on which IHC did not prevail.
IHC cites no precedent for the strange proposition that the burden of allocating fees can
be shifted to the party against whom an award of fees is sought merely by granting it an
extension of time.
Straining to make the fee award appear reasonable even in the absence of
sufficient evidence and compliance with the allocation task, IHC argues that the trial
court "made numerous discounts" to the fees requested. IHC Brief at 49. As the first

24

example, IHC points to a "discount of $91,205.96" from counsel's standard rates. Id. In
reality, counsel billed IHC at the discounted levels, and the court imposed no reduction
from the levels at which IHC was billed. The only reductions made by the court were
incomplete reductions for some of the matters on which IHC did not prevail.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
As stated with more specificity in the Brief of Appellant at 48-49, each of the trial
court's orders from which this appeal was taken should be reversed, and this case should
be remanded for trial, with a conditional award of attorney fees to D&K for this appeal.
DATED this 7A*» day of June, 2007.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
A Professional Corporation

By:x_Michael N. Zundel, Esq.
James C. Swindler
Glenn R. Bronson
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ,2ffM day of June, 2007, I caused two copies of the
foregoing to be served by hand delivery to the following:
D. Matthew Moscon, Esq.
Stoel Rives
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 2004; 12:00 NOON

2

HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER, JUDGE PRESIDING-

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

We are on the record in the matter of

5

IHC Health Services, Incorporated, against D & K Management,

6

case number 990905693.
MR. DURHAM:

7
8

Services.

10

Matthew Durham on behalf of IHC Health

I have Matthew Moscon with me.
MR. BRONSON:

9

Please state appearances.

Glenn Bronson and Mike Zundel on behalf

of D & K Management -

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BRONSON: - principals of D & K with us, Mr.

13

Okay.

(inaudible).
THE COURT:

14

Thank you.

I think I'm glad we're here

15

together on this.

It's one of those ones that in a way becomes

16

very messy, and I apologize.

17

mess in some efforts to keep the thing moving, and the most

18

recent amended order, I don't even think that's correct,

19

unfortunately.

I think I've contributed to the

But we're here really on the issues of (inaudible)

20
21

judgment to Rule 54(b), certification, et cetera.

And there's

22

not much disagreement that the Court has made a final

23

determination on summary judgment on forfeiture, a declaratory

24

judgment.

25

damages.

There is remaining the breach-of-contract claim on
Do we all agree on that, which I think I messed up in

1

unlawful-detainer statutes are that — first of all, that the

2

law enforce the forfeiture.

3

statutes are set up to give a tenant to — this is rent, a

4

monetary obligation under a lease, numerous obligations — at

5

least two in writing, one by the court and one by a landlord,

6

the option to cure any monetary defaults.

7

And so the unlawful detainer

That is not the procedure under which IHC elected to

8

proceed.

They elected to proceed under the common-law

9

ejectment rules, which do not give a tenant the opportunity to

10

cure.

11

argue your breach, but it also delays an immediate eviction

12

remedy.

13

of the statutory provisions, where you can't separate

14

possession and damages, we're not in a position to do that.

15

This is common-law ejectment, and many cases do uphold that.

16

You're in breach, then you go before the court, you

And so it puts the court in a position where, instead

So — well, we didn't get the opportunity to cure.

17

They also don't get the opportunity to kick us out on a.

18

possession order that's not final and it's not appealable.

19

THE COURT:

The problem is I do understand the

20

reasons of the rule; I understand that it's efficiency in terms

21

of appellate review.

22

in a landlord-tenant context where someone whose right to

23

possession has been determined to no longer exist, can stay in

24

possession, increase the damages for a potentially long time,

25

simply because there can be factual disputes and the need to

But isn't it subject to incredible abuse

1

get to trial on the damage claims, whereas it seems like it can

2

give a - it can sort of trump the right to possess one's own

3

property —

4

MR. BRONSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BRONSON:

Well, your Honor -

- on almost a technicality?
Your Honor, the issue of whether or not

7

someone is wrongfully in possession is the issue that is at

8

stake here.

9

THE COURT:

Well, that's the question.

10

stake?

11

What is still at stake about possession?

12

Is that at

If that was at stake, I'd say I'm with you all the way.

MR. BRONSON:

Well, our argument, and the reason we

13

would appeal, is because D & K firmly believes that IHC waived

14

its remedy —

15

THE COURT: Sure.

16

MR. BRONSON:

17

THE COURT: - So why don't we give you the

- of forfeiture.

And so -

18

certification and you go up and appeal it?

19

won't accept it at the Supreme Court?

20

MR. BRONSON:

No.

Do you think they

The point is - the point is, we go

21

back to our original argument.

22

acknowledged and the Supreme Court acknowledged, waiver is an

23

intensely factual issue.

24 J

THE COURT:

25 I

MR. BRONSON:

Waiver, as you have

Oh, absolutely.
D & K is entitled to a trial on that
i

9!

1

issue/ and the only way the court can separate the possession —

2
3

THE COURT:

Well, you're ent,itled if your right that

my rul ing' s wrong —

4

MR. BRONSON :

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BRONSON:

Correct.

- yes.
Our argument, of course, is that we're

7

entitled to a trial on that issue because it is a factual

8

issue.

9

in some situations, perhaps.

10

So your question is, isn't that ripe for abuse.

THE COURT:

Well,

Well, whether a Rule 54(b) certification

11

of whether we have trial, will we resolve the remaining the

12

damage issue, then the court then issues a possession order,

13

what happens to possession pending appeal, whether it's off of

14

54(b) or at the close of all the issues in the case?

15

still in the same position.

16

MR. BRONSON:

You're

We are, and I think we get the

17

opportunity to argue a stay upon appeal and to go through the

18

proper elements of the stay upon appeal -

19
20

THE COURT:

And that stay, would that be argued to

this court or to the appellate court?

21

MR. BRONSON:

22

THE COURT:

23

You're warned. He's going to argue it every where,

24
25

We'll argue with both - to both Probably so.

But wouldn't -

but you knew that.
Okay.

But say I do the 54(b), you just get to move

1

trial on-

2

I mean —
THE COURT:

Well, wait a minute.

What are going to

3

trial on?

4

possession, period, doesn't it?

5

that issue's still alive, and that — I mean that's a very

6

sincere question,

7

It gets to this back to whether you're entitled to

MR. BRONSON:

Okay-

And I guess I'm not sure how

There are mechanisms for IHC to

8

get immediate possession and to have those rights at their

9

disposal-

The mechanism to get immediate possession is not

10

common-law ejectment-

The mechanism which the legislature has

11

laid out is the unlawful detainer enforceable -

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BRONSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

Could they amend and do that?
Pardon?
Could they amend at this stage of the

proceeding and do that?

16

MR. DURHAM:

17

MR. BRONSON:

I would stipulate, Judge.
They can certainly amend.

In fact, I

18

think we would openly stipulate them to amending that, because

19

those statutes which permit the right to a very accelerated

20

ejection are based upon a public policy that a tenant in

21

default, under a technical term, a monetary term, has the right

22

to cure it.

23 I

There are a number of cases.

They go from the waiver

24 I cases to the substantial-compliance cases, where courts have
25 | struck down the forfeiture because the party is in substantial
15

1

compliance, but may have missed on a technicality.

That's the

2

policy underlying unlawful detainer statutes, to give a tenant

3

who missed a late payment the opportunity to cure and not

4

immediately eject them. That's the policy here.

And —

5

THE COURT:

Is that -

6

MR. BRONSOW:

7

THE COURT: - a right available after the court's

- because -

8

found a forfeiture or a waiver?

9

MR. BRONSON:

10

THE COURT:

They didn't proceed under that.

Well, I'm saying if they now amended to

11

use the unlawful detainer, would the right to cure still be

12

available?

13

MR. BRONSON:

Oh, yes.

Oh, yes.

It's a three-day

14

right to cure for the notice to pay or quit, and then, once the

15

action is filed, there's a notice from the court for a right to

16

cure, if I understand the statutes correctly.

17

But my point is, the law abhors a forfeiture, and

18

here we never got the option to cure.

D & K never got the

19

option to cure.

20

possession argument.

21

deliberately elected to proceed in a common-law ejectment.

22

That means they're saddled with the rules with regard to

That's the policy behind the immediate
That's not what they have.

They

23 I common-law ejectment, and that means they don't get possession
24 | until there's a final order, nor do we get to appeal until
25 I there's a final order.
16

1

THE COURT: And what other good is served?

What other

2

judicial economy?

3

really this issue, as you say for the Supreme Court to decide.

4

If this Court decides it wrongly it needs to go back to the

5

finder of fact,

6
7

What other right of the parties is served if

MR. BRONSON: This Court has the authority to revisit
its decision at any point.

8
9

THE COURT: Well, sure, but I'm not going to
reconsider that because I think it's right.

10

MR. BRONSON:

11

THE COURT: - tougher issue is where we go from here

12
13

As your Honor mentioned -

procedurally.
MR. BRONSON:

I didn't cite the cases but your Honor

14

cited the cases, Delgado and Buse and those cases with regard -

15

those are yet to be decided in this case potentially and those

16

issues may very well be on appeal.

17

Court not certify this issue as a final (inaudible) now.

18

THE COURT:

It is appropriate that this

I don't think the Court can determine

19

forfeiture - wavier equaling forfeiture without implicitly

20

dealing with the Delgado-Buse line and the non-substantial -

21

whatever the term is.

22

MR. BRONSON: Substantial compliance.

23

THE COURT: Substantial compliance, yeah.

24 j

MR. BRONSON:

That maybe the case.

That, I think, is

25 | probably another issue that could be ripe for more Supreme
34

1
2

Court review as well.
THEI COURT:

My point I don't disagree with that.

I guess; my

3

befuddlement a little bit is since there are these issues and

4

they may well be good ones and I'll be directed by what the

5

appellate court says, shouldn't it be getting up there as soon

6

as possible and whenever that happens you're going to have to

7

deal with the stay issue,

8
9

MR- BRONSON:

I think Kennecott says no, it shouldn't

get up there as soon as possible.

What they should do is you

10

resolve all these issues and let the court learn the facts one

11

time and decide all -

12

THE COURT: I think that's the core point, whether

13

Kennecott applies, whether we have here common factual issues,

14

I mean I know what Kennecott says and I agree that if we have

15

common factual issues we shouldn't be certifying anything. I

16

think where we disagree is I probably disagree on the waiver.

17

I don't think we have any common factual issues left and I

18

don't think there's any factual dispute left on the issue of

19

totality on waiver but that's for another day. That ruling's

20

behind me and that's going to be decided separately.

21
22
23
24
25

But on Kennecott, it's sort of the same dispute we
have, we just disagree, don't we?
MR. BRONSON: From what I'm - without you having yet
ruled, I think we - I think I can THE COURT:

Just on the understanding of how

1

Kennecott would apply with that.

2

MR. BRONSON:

I think the Court may be disagreeing

3

in principle somewhat with Kennecott but I believe Kennecott

4

and its progeny is very clear.

5

THE COURT:

6

principle. I don't.

No, I wouldn't admit to disagreeing in
I think it's a good rule.

7

(Both talking)

8

THE COURT: - once a common factual issue always a

9

common factual issue.

I guess what I'm missing, Mr. Bronson,

10

is how we really have common factual issues anymore and if you

11

can point those to me -

12

MR. BRONSON: It's not the factual issues underlying

13

the remedies that count.

14

the claims and we have three claims arising out of what they

15

continue to call wrongful possession and a breach of contract.

16

Everyone of the remedies that are available, potentially, arise

17

out of that same nexus of facts. That can't be disputed.

18

all the cases, Kennecott and all the cases that interrupt that

19

say we want a narrow appeal rule and the underlying - the

20

nexus, the overlap of facts when the remedies are different

21

that arise out of the same underlying facts, there is no

22 J certification on appeal.
23 | Kennecott.

It's the common facts that underlie

And

So - and that issue was dealt with in

And to the extent that there are circuits and

24 | districts that go the other way and except another rule, they
25 | were dealt with in Kennecott.
36

1

Their cited case is Olympia.

Olympia was disposed of

2

in Kennecott.

3

is a very narrow approach.

4

course, has its justifications, but the primary justificatioa

5

is to condense or appeal all issues and almost inevitably there

6

certainly will be other issues on appeal from this case.

7

That's not the rule in Utah, The rule in Utah
And the (inaudible) court, of

THE COURT: I'm sure that's true.

Although not quite

8

true.

I mean there could be a damages trial where there isn't

9

that much at issue, but that's for another day.

10

Anything else, Mr. Bronson?

11

MR. BRONSON:

12

THE COURT:

13

aggressive argument.

14

I think that's it, your Honor.
Thank you, and thank you both for a real

I think the bottom line is that the Court has

15

determined, yet to be decided whether the Court is right or

16

wrong but the Court has determined that there is forfeiture.

17

That forfeiture leads to a right to retake the possession.

18

only remaining issues this Court can identify are those that go

19

to the issues of damages resulting from that possession

20

following the forfeiture.

21

common facts initially but at this stage there are no facts yet

22

to be resolved with respect to the issue of forfeiture and

23

possession that are in common with the facts to be resolved

24

regarding the breach of contract damages claim.

25

The

The Court agrees that there were

The Court finds no reason not to, one, agree to issue

I
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1 I in contracts•
2 J
3

The Supreme Court in 1983 said, you affirm a portion
of a contract, you affirm the whole.

4 J the way back to 1936, also*
5 J
6

THE COURT:

Now, that's—goes all

So—

Now, did you argue that to the Supreme

Court?

7

MR, ZUNDEL:

Yes, we did.

8 I

THE COURT: Then they didn't really say that, did

9 J they, when they discussed waiver?

Justice Wilkins, I mean,

10 J that's—wouldn't that make sense, that if that was persuasive
11 J to the Supreme Court, they would have come back and said,
12 I under these facts, one way of raising waiver is you affirm the
13 J part, you affirm the whole?
14 J

I mean, it's a great phrase, I like it.

But why

15 I didn't they pick it up?
16

MR. ZUNDEL:

I—I think they too—I think they took

17 I the—the—they—they took the largest peg sticking out of the
18 J Wall to hang the decision on, which was: You didn't even get
19 I the facts right, Judge.
20

THE COURT: Uh huh.

21 J

MR. ZUNDEL:

So, I'm sending it back to you, it is

22 J premature, at best, at best, it's premature.

At worst, it's

23 I wrong.
24 J

THE COURT:

I guess we're reading it differently.

25 |

I hear your argument, Mr. Zundel, but I—I am not

9

1 j sure that truly, except for at the beginning, you addressed ifty
2 J specific question, you've addressed whether a waiver's
3 J occurred and you made it well, I appreciate it; but if this
4 I Court was to determine under the undisputed facts that are now
5 J in the recprd, that a waiver has not occurred, is there some
6 J reason under the law of summary judgment, this Court could nbt
7

do that?

8

MR- ZUNDEL: Absolutely.

Because there are fact£ in

9 J the record which look—which addressed in the light most
10 J favorable to this client of ours^-of mine, D & K, show a
11 I distinct, unequivocal act of waiver, inconsistent with any
12 J other result, any other intent.
13 J

You know, this idea of corporate intent, let'^—

14

THE COURT: Uh huh.

15

MR. ZUNDEL:

I see that—I see that IHC grabs onto

16 J this, but it doesn't want to acknowledge that, as a
17

corporatipn, it's bound by the acts of its agent. You know,

18 J it—it talks about in its memoranda on its motion, this
19 J motion—
20

THE COURT: Uh huh.

21 I

MR. ZUNDEL:

— i t says, you know, we accepted the

22 J April rent, that should not be held against us because it was
23 J delivered to our home office, and—
24

THE COURT:

25

MR. ZUNDEL:

Well,—
—and w e —

10

1 J

THE COURT:

—what they're saying there, though, is

2 J still consistent. They're saying, within the facts of this
3 I case that are undisputed, when you have to find a knowing, an
4 I intentional waiver, these facts cannot support that under the
5 J totality of the circumstances, which include that that was not
6 J the place the rent was directed to go, plus all the other
7 I facts.
8 I

I don't think it's disavowing the acts of their

9 J agents. They do take—IHC took it, IHC cashed it, IHC kept
10 J it, but that is not, under these circumstances, evidence of
11 J intent.
12 J

MR. ZUNDEL: How do you determine intent?

Are you—

13 J are you saying they couldn't have wanted to waive because they
14 I wanted to do something else with this property that would be
15 I better for th&m?

And I can divine—I can divine that because

16 J they—somebody wanted to do that and nobody would have wanted
17 I to waive this contract that they didn't waive, or do you say
18 I that they don't have a corporate resolution, so they didn't
19 J waive?
20 J

What—what—what are we saying?

21 I

THE COURT:

I—and if I'm—

I mean, I think you plead waiver, you've

22 I got to show the facts that support waiver.
23 |

MR. ZUNDEL: Well, let's—let's show this then/

24 | let's ask—let me ask you this, Judge.
25 I

THE COURT:

Uh huh.

11

1 J

MR- ZUNDEL: Take the hypothetical in a 15-minute

2 I increment.
3 J

THE COURT:

In a what?

I'm sorry.

4 J

MR- ZUNDEL: Or—take a hypothetical, you've got a —

5 I you've got a ten-minute increment, three statements in ten
6 I minutes.
7 I

THE COURT: Oh. Okay.

8 J

MR. ZUNDEL: The first statement is, I default you,

9 I I want—I terminate the contract.
10 J

Five minutes later, you say, okay-

I don't

11 I terminate the contract, I waive.
12 I

Five minutes after that, you say, I—I terminate, I

13 J was only kidding before14 J
15

So, now, do you say, under the totality of the
circumstances, I got two against one?

Or do you say, look, in

16 J that instant, you waived and you're bound by it.
17 J

THE COURT:

You show me those facts and you're going

18 I to win.
19
20
21

MR. ZUNDEL: Okay.
Tenant:

Mr. Urioha's letter. Dear

The—
THE COURT: That's not what—the intent. The intent

22 I isn't even to D & K.

This fits the Court of Appeals decision

23 I sets—suggests enforcement of certain contract conditions
24 | during a period of unlawful possession are not inconsistent
25 I with a desire not to waive.

It's not your hypothetical.

12

